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Since the 1970s voters have increasingly withdrawn a number of
land use decisions from city council chambers and have taken them
into the voting booth. Voters have taken on planning responsibility
through the use of the initiative and referendum. The initiative allows
citizens to propose a municipal ordinance, such as a zoning ordinance
or amendment.' A majority vote of the electorate will enact the
ordinance into law. A referendum is a vote on an action taken by
the local legislative body. The electorate votes either to retain the
law or to reject it.2 Both the initiative and the referendum usually
require proponents to collect a specified number of voters' signatures
on a petition to qualify the measure for the ballot.
The United States Supreme Court heartily endorsed the use of the
initiative and referendum in its 1976 decision in Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises, Inc. 3 The decision came at a time when many
municipalities had recently adopted the initiative and referendum for
land use decisions. Despite the Court's unambiguous support, however, state courts have subsequently been divided on whether to allow

1. E. McQtinrm,
2.

TnE LAw oF Mm~icPA

Id. § 16.53.

3. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).

CoRpoR=Nots § 16.52 (3d ed. 1981).
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direct voter control of land use policy. The states have been concerned
with three conflicts which were not resolved by Eastlake: democratic
decisionmaking as contending with representative government, comprehensive land use planning, and property rights. State courts have
felt a need to choose between these conflicting values.
To date, however, state legislatures have failed to officially acknowledge that local land use policy is being decided by direct vote.
Their failure to enact land use planning procedures tailored to the
initiative and referendum has resulted in simplistic and poorly drafted
measures, inability of the voters to utilize existing planning resources,
lack of protection for property rights, and the oppression of minorities. This article will examine the state court opinions since Eastlake,
discuss the fundamental tensions raised by the initiative and referendum, and suggest methods to resolve these tensions.
I.

INTRODUCTION: LAND USE POLICYMAKING THROUGH THE
INITIAT vE AND R=RENDUM

Current Use of the Initiative and Referendum

A.

The initiative and referendum have developed in the 1970s and
1980s into a popular and viable method for citizen groups to implement their land use goals. The November, 1986 elections in California, a leading user of direct legislation, illustrates this widespread
usage. At least twenty-seven initiatives and referenda reached city
and county ballots in these elections, posing a variety of land use
issues to local voters.4 Eight or more of the measures proposed some
sort of growth control ordinances. Seven measures restricted the
ability of localities to allow construction of onshore facilities related
to offshore oil drilling. Others allowed voters to decide the fate of
specific developments, such as new towns and shopping centers.
Direct legislation has largely been employed in reaction to unwanted
development in the community. This development may be of two
sorts: A specific project, or a general wave of growth and expansion.
Opponents of particular projects will often use a referendum to veto
a specific authorization of a local government. Opponents of growth
in general tend to utilize the initiative process to enact a broad
restriction on future expansion.

4.

L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1986, I, at 24, col. 1.
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1. Growth Control Initiatives
A number of diverse initiative measures can be categorized under
the term "growth control," despite the wide variety of approaches
taken toward this general goal. Some of the differences in approaches
can be explained by different conditions existing in the communitiesone city's concern may be the prevention of urban expansion into
agricultural land while another may be primarily interested in the
infill of urban development. Some of the differences in approaches
can better be explained by the stage of the growth control movements.
Some strategies attempted in the earlier days of the fledgling growth
control movement were abandoned in favor of more successful and
popular techniques.
Some of the earliest, and successful, initiatives proposed limits on
the population of the locality. Such measures were narrowly rejected
in Boulder, Colorado in 1971 and in Brentwood, California.' The
voters of Nevada County, California rejected an initiative in 1978
which would have set a maximum of 50,000 persons in that rural
county. 6 This approach is not commonly used today, perhaps because
of its past failures to win elections, or perhaps because it set a goal
which was too remote from the current problem of assimilating
residential growth and provision of services. However, a related
approach succeeded in Boca Raton, Florida, where voters limited the
total number of "dwelling units" to 40,000. 7
A second early strategy was to impose a moratorium on all building
construction. At least three communities, Livermore and San Jose 9
in California, and Broward County in Florida, 0 have passed such
moratoriums through the initiative process. Livermore citizens qualified their initiative for the ballot in 1972, during a period of rapid
growth which changed the once rural town into a suburb of the San
Francisco Bay area. Their response was to draft a conditional mor-

5. Deutsch, Land Use Growth Controls: A Case Study of San Jose and Livermore
California, 15 SANiTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 8 (1974).

6. Orman, Ballot Box Planning, 25 Pui. An'. REP. No. 6, at 4 (1984).
7.

City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1979).
8. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473,
135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
9. Builders Ass'n v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158
(1974).
10. Save Our County Coalition v. Wittenstein, 351 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App,
1977).
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atorium, banning all construction until three vital public services were
adequate. First, the public schools must not be overcrowded or on
double sessions. Second, sewage treatment must be adequate according to state regulations. Third, the water supply must be sufficient
to avoid rationing and to provide adequate reserves for fire protection. The 1973 San Jose initiative was also passed during the city's
period of rapid expansion. Its measure focused on only one service:
schools. It provided for a freeze on zoning in residential areas, unless
a developer would agree to provide a temporary alternative to school
construction in overcrowded areas.' The moratorium is still occasionally proposed, but is generally coupled with a requirement that
a new comprehensive plan for development be prepared. The moratorium is generally not seen as an end unto itself, but as a temporary
freeze on construction until new growth-restrictive policies can be
enacted.
A similar approach is being attempted in suburban Orange County,
California. Slow-growth activists are attempting to qualify the "Citizens Sensible Growth and Traffic Control Initiative" which would
restrict development in any area with congested roads or a lack of
infrastructure. The initiative proponents hope to place the initiative
on the county ballot in June, 1988, as well as the ballots in twenty12
six Orange County cities.
Probably the most common method used in growth control initiatives is to enact an annual limit on the granting of building permits.
California voters have approved such measures in Camarillo,13 Monterey Park,1 4 Belmont, Union City, Santa Cruz County, and Napa
County. 5 Two different approaches have been used. The measures
in Camarillo and Monterey Park set an absolute number of new
construction permits to be issued annually. Camarillo's ordinance
allows 400 units to be built annually, with exemptions for single
homes, subsidized low-income housing, senior citizen housing, and
small apartment complexes of four or fewer units."6 Monterey Park

11. See Deutsch, supra note 5 at 15-22 (discussing San Jose and Livermore initiatives).
12. See Orange County Register, Dec. 6, 1987, at BI, col. 5.
13. Building Indus. Ass'n v. City of Camarillo, 41 Cal. 3d 810, 815, 718 P.2d 68, 70,
226 Cal. Rptr. 81, 83 (1986).
14.
Lee v. City of Monterey Park, 173 Cal. App. 3d 798, 802, 219 CAL. Rpm. 309, 311

(1985).
15. Orman, supra note 6, at 4-7. Permit limit measures have failed in El Dorado County,
Madera County, Navato, Visalia, and Napa. Id.
16. Building Indus. Ass'n, 41 Cal. 3d at 815, 718 P.2d at 70, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
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allows only 100 new units to be built annually. 17 A second approach,
used by Santa Cruz County, is to decide on the overall annual rate
of growth, and to adjust the number of permits accordingly.' 8 Its
growth control ordinance requires the county board of supervisors

to set the desired growth rate each year. The permit limit approach
seems to appeal to voters due to its ability to restrict the annual rate
of growth, in the short term as well as the long term. The number
of permits allowed, however, may be arbitrary, not closely related
to the city's capacity to provide services or absorb growth.
Another popular initiative approach is to restrict development in
areas that the locality wants to protect, such as agricultural land or
hillsides. Voters in Riverside, 19 Gilroy, Sutter County, and Sonoma
County, California, z" were presented with measures designed to preserve agricultural areas. Only the Riverside measure passed, however,
perhaps reflecting greater hostility toward restrictive zoning in less
urbanized areas. Hillside development restrictions were proposed in
Fremont, Saratoga, South San Francisco, and Hayward, California, 2'
with two cities for and two cities against. The successful Fremont
measure reacted to proposals to build in highly visible hill areas with
a measure that drastically reduced the number of hillside homes that
could be built, from 1400 to 250. The measure also restricted density
of development to ten acre lots. It further restricted density to twenty
acre lots for areas without city services and banned development
altogether on the steeper hills. The agricultural and hillside initiatives
have the advantage of targeting a specific type of unwanted development. Of course, with this targeting comes intense opposition from
property owners in the restricted areas.2 The Sonoma County Farmlands initiative, for example, drew its primary opposition from the
local Farm Bureau, individual farmers and ranchers, as well as other
real estate interests.2 3
A more recent target of growth control initiatives has been the
urban center. San Francisco voters have approved six measures in
the last decade restricting development in the city's downtown area. '

17.
18.
19.
AFF. Q.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Lee, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
Orman, supra note 6, at 3-5.
Gottdiener & Neiman, Characteristicsof Support for Local Growth Control, 17 URn.
55 (1981).
Orman, supra note 6, at 3-7.
Id.
Id. at 5-8.
Id. at 9.

24. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1986, I, at 3, col. 3.
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Los Angeles voters passed Proposition U in November, 1986. 21 This
proposition restricts the size and number of new buildings allowed
in commercial and industrial zones, forcing new commercial construction into several areas of highrise commercial development. San Diego
voters also passed an initiative in 1985 to encourage development in
more urbanized areas of the city in order to limit growth on the
26
urban fringe.
2. Direct Votes on Specific Projects
Citizen groups have attempted to stop unwanted development
through the use of both the initiative and referendum. When almost
any kind of significant project is proposed, the developer must ask
the local government for a zoning amendment. 27 Many states, though
not all, Allow citizens to place a referendum on a local government
rezoning approval on the ballot.2 The citizens must generally circulate
a petition protesting the government action, gathering a specified
number of signatures in a short time period after the rezoning
ordinance is enacted. 29 The question is put to a vote of the locality.
A negative vote will nullify the rezoning, leaving the zoning in the
same state as before the amendment was enacted.
Project-specific votes have occurred nationwide, unlike growth
control initiatives, which tend to be concentrated in California and
other western and sunbelt states. Perhaps the leading users of the
process are the cities of Ohio. A study of one representative area of
Ohio, Cuyahoga County, shows a wide acceptance of direct voter
participation in rezoning decisions.3 0 Professor Ronald H. Rosenberg
compiled the voting records of the county from 1962 to 1982. In
those 20 years he found 152 referenda, with the voters authorizing
the rezoning in 61% of the cases, and 35 initiatives, which passed
48% of the time. In the sixty cities of Cuyahoga County, he found
six different referendum regimes.3 1 First were those cities which

25. L.A. Times, Nov. 5, 1986, I, at 3, col. 1.
26. City & State: Crane's Newspaper of Public Business and Finance, Dec. 1985, at 25.
27. Glenn, State Law Limitations on the Use of Initiatives and Referenda in Connection
with Zoning Amendments, 51 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 265, 271 (1978). Land is often placed in a
restrictive zone, with few permitted uses, so that any developmental proposal will require the
developer to come to the city to seek permission to build. Id.
28. Longhini, Ballot Box Zoning, PLANNiNa, at 11 (May, 1985).
29. E. McQun.uN, supra note 1, § 16.59.
30. Rosenberg, Referendum Zoning: Legal Doctrine and Practice, 53 U. CiN. L. Rnv.
381, 426-31 (1983).
31. Id. at 422.
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neither authorized nor prohibited initiatives and referenda, but implicitly recognized the voters' right of direct legislation. Second were
those cities which authorized a general right of initiative and referendum in their charter or ordinances, but did not specifically provide
for direct legislation on land use questions.
A third group of cities subjected all zoning amendments to mandatory referenda. A fourth alternative was the "ward veto" system,
in which the voters in the election ward where the subject land was
located have a direct vote on the project. Fifth, some cities required
a mandatory referendum for multi-family housing only. Sixth, some
cities require the proponent of rezoning to subject his or her property
to a mandatory referendum, and also to pay for the costs of the
election. 32 Approximately a third of the cities had some sort of
mandatory referendum. Professor Rosenberg suggests that a number
of city referendum laws were plainly illegal or of dubious validity,
but had not been successfully challenged in court.
Direct votes, both in Ohio and in other states, have been taken
on a variety of projects which the sponsors of initiatives and referenda
have found objectionable. A number of votes have been forced on
proposed shopping centers, from a small center to be converted from
an old high school33 to major regional malls. 34 Many referenda have
concerned the construction of new towns or planned unit developments. Ohio citizens were successful in subjecting a 164 acre "community unit plan" to a referendum vote. 35 On a larger scale, Alameda
County, California voters turned down the 4500 acre Las Positas
new town which had a projected population of 45,000 residents.3 6
Projects which would put commercial development, office buildings,
or hotels in areas zoned residential have also been subject to referenda. 37 Opponents of specific industrial projects have been less successful in forcing votes on such development. Citizens in Hooksett,
New Hampshire failed in attempting to require a vote on the siting
of a hazardous waste facility in their town, 38 and citizens of San
32. The city of Eastlake, Ohio enacted such a system. The text of the city ordinance is
included in the dissent of Justice Stevens in Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S.
668, 686-87 (1975).

33.
34.

State ex rel. Hickman v. City Council, 690 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. App. 1985).
Leonard v. City of Bothell, 557 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1976).

35.

Peachtree Dev. Co. v. Paul, 423 N.E.2d 1087 (Ohio 1981).

36. Orman, supra note 6, at 9-10.
37. See, e.g., Referendum Comm. v. Hermosa Beach, 184 Cal. App. 3d 152, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 51 (1986) (Hotel/Conference center/parking garage on city land); State ex rel. Srovnal
v. Linton, 346 N.E.2d 764 (Ohio 1976) (Hotel/Office building).
38. Stablex Corp. v. Town of Hooksett, 456 A.2d 94 (N.H. 1982).
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Marcos, California, likewise failed in putting to a vote the siting of
a solid waste disposal plant.3 9 Citizens failed to get referenda on the

operation of gravel pits in two Ohio cities, 40 but a California county
successfully voted on an initiative requiring a buffer zone between
surface mining operations and residential areas. 41 Referenda have
been held on rezoning for multi-family apartment projects. 42 Voters
4

in vacation areas have forced votes on proposed resort projects.

1

The diversity of projects which have been the subject of referenda
illustrates that virtually any change in the environment can stir the

wrath of local residents. A referendum or initiative is a useful weapon
against most types of unwanted change. 44
B.

The Legal Background: Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,

Inc.
The only case in which the Supreme Court has directly passed on
the validity of the direct vote on a land use matter is Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc.45 Chief Justice Burger's opinion in that
case celebrated the initiative and referendum as "a basic instrument

of democratic government."' ' Beneath the surface, however, lay a
traditional case of zoning with an exclusionary impact. The direct
result of the Eastlake referendum was to defeat a proposed apartment

building, with the resulting exclusion of minorities and persons of
low income. The case is remarkable not only for its decision upholding zoning through the initiative and referendum, but for its
non-decision on the issue of exclusion through direct democracy.47

39. Wiltshire v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 3d 296, 218 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1985).
40. Shelly & Sands v. Franklin County Bd. of Elections, 465 N.E.2d 883 (Ohio 1984),
State ex rel. Griffin v. Krumholtz, 435 N.E.2d 1110 (Ohio 1982).
41. Bailey v. County of El Dorado, 162 Cal. App. 3d 94, 210 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1984).
42. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1975); Bruce
v. City of Alameda, 166 Cal. App. 3d 18, 212 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1985).
43. County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins., 653 P.2d 766 (Haw. 1982); Thirty
Voters v. Doi, 599 P.2d 286 (Haw. 1979).
44. The referendum has pragmatic appeal to 'no growth' advoates who oppose any
development. By adding an additional level of decisionmaking, the requirement of
voter approval of rezonings does more than increase the likelihood that a rezoning
petition ultimately will be rejected. It also decreases the landowners' incentive to
propose new developments that require zoning amendments because of the increased
costs of delay, publicity, and uncertainty associated with a referendum.
Note, The Proper Use of Referenda in Rezoning, 29 STAN. L. REv. 819, 824-25 (1977).
45. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
46. Id. at 679.
47. Justice Stem, in his concurring Ohio Supreme Court opinion, advocated that the court's
decision focus on the exclusionary zoning issue. 41 Ohio St.2d 187, 199, 324 N.E.2d 740, 748
(1975).
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Eastlake can be seen as part of two lines of cases. First are those
which generally uphold the use of the initiative and referendum.48
The second includes those in which the court declined to hold that
the 14th amendment prevents government actions with a discriminatory impact. 49 Within this general category are a string of cases
which effectively withdrew the federal courts as forums for resolving
exclusionary zoning disputes.
Eastlakeinvolved a challenge to a mandatory referendum ordinance
adopted by the voters of Eastlake, Ohio. Forest City Enterprises
acquired an eight acre parcel zoned for "light industrial" uses. It
applied to the city for a zoning change to permit construction of a
multi-family high-rise apartment building. The zoning change was
recommended by the planning commission and approved by the
Eastlake city council. During the process of this rezoning, however,
the voters of Eastlake approved an initiative requiring any changes
in land use to be approved by a fifty-five percent vote, in a referendum election to be financed by the developer. The zoning amendment to the Forest City property was subsequently submitted to the
electorate but failed to win approval.
Forest City filed an action against Eastlake in state court to have
the initiative charter provision held unconstitutional. The Ohio Supreme Court found that rezoning by referendum was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in violation of the 14th
amendment due process clause. The court invalidated the mandatory
referendum provision because of its failure to provide standards to
guide the voters' decision. The referendum, stated the court, allowed

the police power to be exercised in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.50
Finding the referendum a power reserved by the people, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the Ohio ruling. The Court's ruling
is premised upon the Madisonian idea that all power derives from
the people. Under this theory, the people of Ohio transferred their
power of legislation to their elected representatives but reserved the
power of initiative and referendum for themselves. The initiative and
referendum are therefore not delegations of power from the legisla-

48. The first case upholding the initiative and referendum was Pacific States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). See also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
49. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
50. 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975).
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ture to the people, but powers which the people had never given
51
up.
The Court celebrated the initiative and referendum as part of the
American tradition of direct democracy. It compared them to the
town meeting, "a practical and symbolic part of our democratic
processes." The referendum, said the Court, allows "direct political
participation," giving the people "veto power over enactments of
'52
representative bodies."
The Court found that the due process clause imposes no standards
on the voters other than the standard of Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co. that the zoning not be arbitrary or unreasonable. 3 The
Court distinguished two cases relied upon by the Ohio Supreme
Court, Eubank v. Richmond54 and Washington ex rel. Seattle Title
Trust Co. v. Roberge.51 The Ohio court cited those cases for the
proposition that the legislature could not delegate legislative power
to the electorate. In the Eubank case, the Supreme Court invalidated
a city ordinance which gave the owners of property the power to
establish building setback lines on their street, upon two-thirds approval.5 6 In the Roberge case, the Supreme Court invalidated an
ordinance which permitted the establishment of philanthropic homes
for the aged in residential areas, but only upon the written consent
of two-thirds of the neighboring property owners.5 7 The Eastlake
opinion distinguished those cases as involving the delegation of
legislative power from the people to a legislative body and then
delegated back to "a narrow segment of the community, not to the
people at large." ' 58 The Eastlake ordinance'not only allowed the full
community to decide, but also involved a reserved power rather than
a redelegated power.
Eastlake was seen by commentators as one of a number of 1970's
Supreme Court zoning decisions which indicated a hands-off approach to zoning controversies. More specifically, Eastlake was seen
as one of a series of cases in which the Court abdicated any
responsibility for remedying exclusionary zoning on constitutional

51.
52.

Eastake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1976).
Id. at 672-73.

53. Id. at 676-77.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

226 U.S. 137 (1912).
278 U.S. 116 (1928).
Eubank, 226 U.S. at 144.
Roberge, 278 U.S. at 120.
Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 677.
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grounds. 9 The other key rulings included Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,60 in which the Court
refused to order the city to zone for multi-family housing without
proof of intent to exclude minorities; Warth v. Seldin, 61 in which the
Court imposed strict standing requirements for exclusionary zoning
challenges; and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,62 in which the Court
allowed cities to use their zoning laws to exclude unrelated persons
from living together.
The facts underlying Eastlake certainly provided an ample opportunity for a pronouncement on exclusionary zoning. Although the
Ohio court opinion did not decide the issue, the problem was
discussed in the concurring opinion of Justice Stern.
There can be little doubt of the true purpose of Eastlake's charter
provision-it is to obstruct change in land use, by rendering such
change so burdensome as to be prohibitive. The charter provision
was apparently adopted specifically, to prevent multi-family housing,
and indeed was adopted while Forest City's application for rezoning
to permit a multi-family housing project was pending before the
City Planning Commission and City Council .... There is no
subtlety to this; it is simply an attempt to render change difficult
and expensive under the guise of popular democracy. 63
Only Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan showed an inclination to
pursue the exclusionary zoning question, however. Thus Eastlake and
the other cases effectively sent plaintiffs to their state courts to
pursue state remedies for exclusionary zoning problems. Eastlake's
judicial abdication of a federal forum for exclusionary effects can
be viewed as encouraging strong state court remedies, free from
federal interference. This view is exemplified by Mt. Laurel and other
4
state inclusionary decisions.

59. Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (1978); Wolfstone, The Case for a

ProceduralDue Process Limitation on the Zoning Referendum: City of Eastlake, Revisited, 7
L.Q. 5 1 (1977); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Zoning Referenda-MandatoryReferenda
on All Municipal Land Use Changes Do Not Violate the Due Process Clause. City of Eastlake
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976), 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 141, 144 (1976);
Note, Constitutional Law-Municipal Zoning-Mandatory Referdum For Zoning Amendments-Lawful Delegation of Legislative Power Due Process; City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976), 10 AscsoN L. REv. 557, 564 (1977); Little, The United
States Supreme Court and Land Use Regulation: The Lastest Round, 52 Tur.. L. Rnv. 476,
500 (1978).
EcOLOGY

60. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
61.
62.
63.

422 U.S. 490 (1975).
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
324 N.E.2d 740, 748 (Ohio 1975).

64.

Southern Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 335 A.2d

713 aff'd, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).

804
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Eastlake's other facet, its support for the use of the referendum
and initiative on land use questions, has had less impact. Since the
Eastlake ruling in 1976, as many states have abolished or restricted
the use of direct land use votes as have authorized their use. 65 This
results partly from the structure of the legal question of Eastlake.
The Court saw its task as merely determining whether the Constitution forbids the use of the initiative and referendum for land use
legislation, not whether the Constitution requires its use. On the
other hand, the Court's opinion contains a vigorous argument in
favor of direct democracy. The Court could have, if it had chosen
to, resolved some of the states' difficulties with the deficiencies of
the initiative and referendum, and influenced further use of the
technique. Instead, the Court primarily reiterated the arguments in
favor of direct democracy, without resolving some of the tensions
that it raises.
Eastlake came in the wake of two other rulings of mandatory
referenda. In the 1969 case of Hunter v. Erickson,66 the Court
invalidated an initiative ordinance passed by the voters of Akron,
Ohio, which required a mandatory referendum on fair housing ordinances. The initiative required a referendum for any ordinance
regulating property on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, or ancestry. The initiative coincided with a fair housing
ordinance recently passed by the Akron City Council, requiring equal
opportunity to housing regardless of race or background. The Court
struck down the initiative as disadvantaging efforts to strike down
racial and other discrimination as opposed to other regulation of the
real estate market. Two years later, however, the court upheld a
mandatory referendum provision for low-income housing in James
v. Valtierra.67 In that case, the voters of California enacted an
initiative which required a referendum on the approval of any low
rent housing project. The court distinguished the facts from Hunter
on the grounds that the California provision did not explicitly create
a classification based upon race.
Neither the rhetoric of these two cases, nor that of Eastlake, shows
any attempt to reconcile the dangers of direct democracy with its
advantages. The Hunter opinion spoke of the need for minority

65. States authorizing the use of the initiative and referendum include California, Colorado, Florida, and Missouri. States restricting their use include Texas, Idaho, Washington,
New Mexico, Oregon, and West Virginia. See infra notes 153-79.
66. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
67. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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protection against unrestrained majority sentiment, 8 while the James
opinion celebrated the referendum as "devotion to democracy, not
to bias, discrimination, or prejudice." 6 9 The Eastlake Court continued
this pattern of polarized rhetoric by citing James and ignoring
Hunter. Yet the three cases refer to the same phenomenon-direct
democracy. The initiative and referendum provide unique opportunities to directly tap the sentiment of the people, while they risk
allowing the majority to overwhelm minorities. Eastlake could have
integrated these elements of direct democracy into a coherent statement on the initiative and referendum, but neglected to do so. In
failing to do so, Eastlake limited its influence on state courts which
would later consider their own localities' use of direct legislation to
adopt land use laws.
II.

THE PEOPLE, THE POLInCLA~NS, AND
THE PLANNERS

A. Historical Origins of the Tension Between Direct Democracy
and Representative Democracy
Chief Justice Burger's reference to the town meeting tradition in
his Eastlake opinion captured one image of direct democracy in
American history. As the modern heirs of the Athenian democracy,
the town meeting and referendum share a heritage of heightened
citizen participation in making the decisions of governance. Burger's
opinion, however, failed to reflect the opposite image of direct
democracy which has simultaneously existed throughout American
history. The failure of the Eastlake opinion to deal with and reconcile
the opposing preference for representative democracy has limited the
influence of Eastlake in promoting direct democracy.

James Madison showed a strong preference for limiting direct
public participation in national politics. In The Federalist Papers,
No. 10, he argued for the establishment of a republican form of
government.
[A] pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a
small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.
A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by
a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from

68. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
69. James, 402 U.S. at 141.
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the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the
inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of
turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with
personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been
as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths...
[I]t may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the
representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public
good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for
70

the purpose.

Madison's reservations about direct democracy inspired a number
of structural checks against majority rule. The Constitution established the House of Representatives as the only directly elected body.
Both the Senate and the President originally were indirectly elected
by intermediate bodies-the state legislatures and the electoral college.
Moreover, the Constitution has never provided for direct legislative
decisionmaking by the voters.
Yet at the same time, as noted by de Tocqueville, direct democracy
flourished in the cities and towns of the early republic. DeTocqueville
wrote of a decentralized style of government that had developed a
populace which was "enlightened, awake to their own interests, and
accustomed to take thought for them. 71 He painted a picture of
citizens enthusiastically participating in their own governance, often
making mistakes, but drawing on their creative energy to solve the
problems of the day. Direct participation in the United States brought
a legitimacy to government that de Tocqueville found missing in
Europe.
It is not always feasible to call on the whole people, either directly
or indirectly, to take its part in lawmaking, but no one can deny
that when that can be done the law draws great authority therefrom.
This popular origin, though often damaging to the wisdom and
quality of legislation, gives it peculiar strength. There is a prodigious
force in the expression of the wills of a whole people. When it
of those who
stands out in broad daylight, even the imagination
72
would like to contest it is somehow smothered.
The unique features of the New England town meeting illustrate
how the Madisonian and Tocquevillian notions of popular partici-

pation could coexist. The homogeneity of the town residents made

70.
71.
72.
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them resistent to the factions that worried Madison. The stability of
the town population provided an incentive to keep the peace by
satisfying minority concerns. The small size of the towns allowed
everyone (at least all landowning adult males) to actively participate,
either at the meetings or in the informal discussions which were
generally held prior to town votes. As a result, the votes were often
unanimous, reflecting a consensus which resulted from a distaste for
oppressive majority tactics and a sensitivity to minority concerns. 73
At least in the stable, homogeneous environment of early New

England, direct democracy could survive as a viable system of governance.
The next surge of interest in direct democracy came in the Progressive movement of the early 20th century. At the center of the
Progressive agenda was the establishment of the initiative and referendum. 74 The Progressive activists, political and blood descendants
of the Yankees of the New England towns, revived de Tocqueville's
vision of the capable and energetic citizen. 75 They sought to increase
citizen decisionmaking as they diminished the power of legislatures,
political parties, politicians, and powerful private organizations. 76
The Progressives placed their trust in individual citizens, assuming
an informed and educated citizenry which was ready and able to
take control of the important policy decisions of government. 77 They
were opposed by members of the European ethnic groups which had
succeeded at taking control of state and local government, and the
organizations which influenced those governments. 78 In California
for instance, the goal of the Progressives was to kick the Southern
Pacific Railroad out of politics, and all those elected officials who
succumbed to its influence. 79 Although most Progressives did not
assume that all important decisions would be decided by initiative
and referendum, they did envision a major role for direct legislation. 0
The Progressive movement left several major structural reforms:
direct election of United States senators, suffrage for women, and
the establishment of the initiative, referendum, and recall in a number

73.
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of states. The result, however, was nothing like the reestablishment
of Athenian democracy. Instead, it reflected the continuing coexistence of direct and representative democracy in the United States.
The reforms made a significant inroad for direct participation, but
left the core structure of representative government basically untouched.
A second wave of progressivism brought new calls for increased
citizen participation in government. This new distrust of government
can be traced to such events as the Vietnam War, urban rioting, and
Watergate. The rhetoric of this era is similar to that of the Progressive
era, in the sharp criticism of elected officials and the exalting of
popular decisionmaking powers. 81 This era brought increased use of
the initiative and referendum in states which had adopted direct
legislation, and calls for its adoption on the national level and in
other states.8 2 The citizen revolt against their representatives is best
symbolized by the passage of California's Proposition 13, which can
be interpreted as a broad restructuring of the relative powers of
voters and elected officials. Other democratic reforms in this period
include the expansion of direct presidential primaries, expanded voting rights for blacks and 18-year-olds, and congressionally mandated
opportunities for citizen participation in federally funded programs. 8 3
In the 20th century, the United States has seen a series of expansions of the ability of citizens to directly participate in government.
At the same time, however, representative government has also
retained its vitality as a suitable method to deal with the increasingly
complex problems of governance. The town meeting tradition remains
more as a symbol of direct citizen participation rather than as a
workable model of how to govern today's larger and more diverse
cities. While the line between representative democracy and direct
democracy has moved a number of times in this century, the Madison-

Tocqueville struggle remains.
B. The People v. The Politicians: How State Courts Have
Responded to the Tension in Land Use Controversies
The tension between direct and representative democracy is as old
as the republic, and is now being played out in a variety of land use
controversies. A leading contemporary writer on the initiative and

81. Id. at 26.
82. Id. at 25-26.
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referendum, David Magleby, sums up this debate. "Direct democracy
values participation, open access, and political equality. It tends to
deemphasize compromise, continuity and consensus ....

Indirect

democracy values stability, consensus, and compromise and seeks
institutional arrangements that insulate fundamental principles from
momentary passions or fluctuations in opinion." 4
The Eastlake opinion did not attempt to reconcile these opposing
values, but instead emphasized the longstanding arguments in favor
of the referendum and initiative. The Court celebrated the initiative
as "a basic instrument of democratic government," and "a classic
demonstration of 'devotion to democracy,"' assuring that "all the
people of the community will have a voice." 85 The Court's failure
to rebut the Madisonian view of direct legislation has left state courts
on their own in reconciling their states' provisions for land use
planning and the initiative and referendum. The courts face a difficult
dilemma-the arguments for and against the direct vote on land use
matters both implicate wholesome, traditional American values. Although courts have the power to deny the vote to citizens, they are
naturally reluctant to do so explicitly.
1. Direct Democracy v. Representative Democracy
At the core of this tension is the debate between those who advocate
maximum direct public participation in the decision of land use
questions and those who advocate decisions by officials elected by
the voters. Both sides agree that the people should ultimately make
the policy choices. The question is how those choices should be
made-through elected representatives or direct voting.
In a perfectly representative system, the initiative and referendum
would be unnecessary. Local officials would be elected on the basis
of their policy stances on land use issues important to the voters.
Representatives would consult with their constituents before acting
on a rezoning or conditional use permit, and would attempt to bring
about a result consistent with their constituents' policy preferences.
The drafting of ordinances would be enhanced by the expertise and
sensitivity of elected officials, who would craft legislation that satisfied their constituents and accommodated outside interests as well.

84. D. MAOGEBY, supra note 74, at 181.
85. Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1976) (quoting James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141, 143 (1971)).
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While this idealized scenario may be unrealistic, it is the vision
that prompted a Pennsylvania court in 1978 to hold that the initiative
and referendum were unavailable in land use planning and zoning
matters.16 In relying on an earlier state ruling the court spoke of the
initiative:
[it] is inconsistent with our representative democratic form of government . . .. One of the prices paid for the creation of a representative democracy is the vesting by the electorate of trust and
responsibility in its elected representatives. Discretion is placed
within the hands of the municipal legislators and we must accept
the lawful exercise of this discretion. The efficiency of government,
its stability, and the protection of the public at large necessitates
the creation of certain categories wherein the legislative prerogative
7
is unfettered by the initiative and referendum processes.
The argument for direct democracy, however, is predicated on a
breakdown of the representative process. Just as the California
Progressives advocated direct legislation to combat the influence of
the railroad, today's initiative and referendum proponents advocate
direct legislation to combat the influence of the real estate developer.
Local officials have often been charged with a bias toward real estate
interests at the expense of their constituents' desires. As one commentator stated, "local politicians have demonstrated parochialism,
' 8
favoritism, stupidity, and greed in regulating land development. 1
Widespread corruption in land use regulation was found in a report
of the Stanford Research Institute.8 9 The corruption is both nonsystematic, as when a local official occasionally takes a bribe to
influence his vote, and systematic, as when a system of campaign
contributions is used to cultivate a cooperative relationship between
officials and real estate interests. 90
The proponents of initiatives and referenda see the availability of
those devices as "the gun behind the door" which prevents local
officials from making decisions contrary to public interest. 91 When
the decision is "wrong" citizens can step in with an initiative or
referendum to correct the representative deficiency. This is the theory
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behind one of the strongest state court defenses of the initiative and
referendum. In Margolis v. District Court, the Colorado Supreme
Court upheld the use of the referendum to challenge the rezoning of
various sized properties. 92 The court stated that "a heightened community sensitivity to the quality of the living environment and an
increased skepticism of the judgment of elected officials provide
much of the impetus for the voters' exercise of the powers of
' 93
referenda and initiative in the zoning context.
The actual experience with direct legislation on land use matters,
however, supports neither of these extreme views. The relationship
between direct voting and representative politics tends to be symbiotic
and reinforcing. Direct democracy often exists as an odd hybrid of
citizen involvement and representative politics.
An initiative or referendum can be used as a method of stirring
debate in the community on an issue of land development, forcing
local officials or candidates to confront the issue. Forcing the issue
requires officials and candidates to take a stand, thereby giving voters
a clearer choice, and curing the representational defect. This was the
pattern in the growth control moratorium initiatives in San Jose and
Livermore, California in the early 1970s. In both cities the initiatives
were opposed by the local power structure. The San Jose opponents
included the mayor, a majority of the city council, builders, construction unions, and the chamber of commerce. Similarly, the Livermore opposition came from the entire council and from local
builders. The voters of both cities not only approved the initiatives,
but voted out the opposing council members and replaced them with
majorities of growth control supporters.94
Conversely, initiatives and referenda are often sponsored by local
officials or candidates to further their policy goals or personal
ambitions. 95 Issue activists may see their sponsorship of a successful
initiative or referendum as a method of attaining public recognition
and aiding a future run for elective office. Maverick public officials
use the initiative and referendum process to allow them to bypass
normal legislative channels to take their proposal directly to the
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people. This technique was recently used successfully by former San
Diego Mayor Roger Hedgecock, who had failed in his attempts to
block city council approval of the development of 5100 acres of
"urban reserve" in the undeveloped northern portion of the city. He
and his allies then sponsored an initiative which reversed the council
approval and prevented development of the area for ten years. Using
colorful rhetoric to appeal to the voters, Hedgecock portrayed his
own city council as the villain in the campaign. He said that passage
of the measure was necessary to prevent the "slaughter of the urban
reserve," to prevent San Diego from becoming "just a slightly smaller
version of Los Angeles." 96 He claimed that the campaign to defeat
the initiative was financed "by the usual gang of developers who
have so successfully controlled city council decisions," and resisted
ceding control to San Diego voters. The voters approved the initiative.
Sometimes the message sent by the vote on an initiative or referendum will conflict with the message sent by the vote for elected
representatives. The resiliency of the direct vote is illustrated by two
examples of this potential conflict occurring in Northern California.
The initiative and referendum prevailed in these instances, due partly
to the great strength of the direct vote and partly to the greater
policy specificity of the mandate sent by approval of direct legislation.
In June, 1978 (the same election in which California voters approved
Proposition 13) the voters of Santa Cruz County approved a strong
growth control measure which left the implementation to the county
board of supervisors. At the same time, the voters also recalled two
supervisors who were in support of the measure, replacing them with
two opponents of growth control. Although this left a majority of
the board which was hostile to the measure, the board adopted a
surprisingly strong program to implement it. The supervisors chose
to implement a two percent annual growth rate, a rate which would
cut in half the current rate of growth. 97 Similarly, the voters of the
city of Fremont approved an initiative measure which restricted
hillside development, over the opposition of majorities of the city
council and planning commission. After the measure's passage the
planning commission, apparently attempting to facilitate a court
challenge to the initiative as an invalid government taking, recom-
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mended that the council designate a larger protected hill area than
even the measure's supporters had envisioned. The council, however,
designated a smaller boundary which was considered more reasonable
and defensible. 98 Both the Santa Cruz County and Fremont initiatives
illustrate the complex relationship between the roles of direct democracy and representative decisionmaking on land use issues, a
relationship that resembles neither Madisonian nor Progressive expectations.
2. Deficiencies of the Initiative and Referendum
a. Majority Tyranny vs. "Devotion to Democracy"
Four major deficiencies of the initiative and referendum have
worried courts reviewing land use votes. Perhaps the most troubling
of these deficiencies is the ability of the populace to use the direct
vote to oppress minorities. The need to temper the will of the majority
to accommodate the needs of the minority becomes more acute in a
direct vote than in representational politics.
Derrick A. Bell, Jr. explained why a representative system is
preferable to a direct vote for the protection of minority interests. 99
First, the public spotlight in which officials cast their votes creates
pressures to vote to protect minority interests. Even those representatives whose constituencies oppose civil rights legislation will often
respond to minority pressures. Politicians "do not wish publicly to
advocate racism; they cannot openly attribute their opposition to
'racist constituents." ' 100 Second, the representative system can translate intensity of interest into victories for minority groups. 1ol A city
councilman with ten percent of his constituents intensely lobbying
for approval of a low income housing project, and ninety percent of
his constituents mildly opposed, will often vote to approve the
project. These two checks on majoritarianism, however, are absent
from the initiative and referendum process. "[Few] of the concerns
that can transform the 'conservative' politician into a 'moderate'
public official are likely to affect the individual voter's decision. No
political factors counsel restraint on racial passions emanating from
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longheld and little considered beliefs and fears." 10 2 Furthermore, a
direct vote cannot capture the intensity of voters' interests. While
the intense minority may have a higher voter turnout rate, it is still
likely to lose to the mildly interested majority.
The fear of minority oppression can be traced to Madison, who
feared that the majority would "sacrifice the weaker party" and
tamper with property rights and individual liberties. 103 Madison's
writings were cited in Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Reitman v. Mulkey:
And to those who say that Proposition 13 represents the will of the
people of California, one can .only reply: 'Wherever the real power
in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our
Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community,
and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not
from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents,
but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of
the major number of the Constituents. This is the truth of great
importance, but not yet sufficiently attended to ... 104
The opposing benign viewpoint is best illustrated by the writings
of Justice Black in his majority opinion in James v Valtierra,"°" and
the dissent in Reitman.' In James he wrote:
Provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not
to bias, discrimination or prejudice ....
The people of California
have also decided by their own vote to require referendum approval
of low-rent public housing projects. This procedure ensures that all
the people of a community will have a voice in a decision which
may lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds for
increased public services and to lower tax revenues. It gives them a
voice in decisions that will affect the future development of their
own community.? 7
The Eastlake opinion followed Justice Black's benign view of direct
democracy,108 ignoring the exclusionary intent aspect of that case. In
adopting wholesale the positive image of direct democracy, the court
failed in these opinions to give needed guidance to states on how
they could prevent the great power and legitimacy accompanying
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plebiscites from being used for the uglier purposes of excluding
minorities and poor persons. The Court showed in Hunter v. Erickson
that it would guard against such use of the initiative and referendum.' 9 In noting that the impact of the Akron initiative fell disproportionately on minorities, Justice White wrote that "the majority
needs no protection against discrimination, and if it did, a referendum
might be bothersome but no more than that." 110 The minority,
however, received the protection of the court when the political
process failed to safeguard its interests.
More recent attempts to stop low-income housing projects through
the initiative and referendum have been thwarted by state and federal
statutes preventing discrimination against affordable housing. A California court of appeals threw out an initiative ordinance in 1985
that required the approval of city voters to authorize the construction
of government subsidized rental housing."' The court found the
initiative ordinance to be preempted by a state statute that prevented
localities from discriminating against residential development intended
for persons of low and moderate income. 12 As a result of this
statute, drafters of growth control initiatives in California have
exempted low-income housing from the restrictions of the ordinance. 3
Conversely, the image of the dominant majority as oppressor can
be flipped so that the minority is the oppressor. This is particularly
true in states where qualifying a referendum for the ballot automatically suspends the ordinance until the election is held. In these states,
a minority consisting of the proponents and signers of the petition
may suspend and possibly nullify the enactment of a democratically
elected legislative body. The Arizona Supreme Court showed its
distrust of this facet of the referendum process when it invalidated
a referendum petition in Cottonwood Development v. Foothills Area
Coalition of Tucson, Inc.: "This power which is reserved to the
people is not without opportunity for abuse. A small minority of
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the voters has the power to suspend legislation enacted by the duly
elected representatives of the people, legislation that could be supported by a majority of the electors at the subsequent referendum
14
election."1
b. Meeting Regional Needs
Ensuring that local land use decisions are consistent with regional
needs is difficult, but the problem is exacerbated when the decision
is made by the electorate rather than the local legislative body. First,
the electorate is less aware of the regional responsibilities of local
government. Elected officials may not be any more receptive than
the electorate to accommodating regional needs, but they at least
know they have the responsibility.
Second, initiatives and referenda weaken the ability of the courts
to supervise land use decisions to ensure compliance with regional
needs. A number of states require local governments to justify policy
decisions which exclude high-density, affordable housing or conflict
with other regional needs. Courts in these states require a record of
public hearing transcripts, evidence received, reports, and other legislative material to form the judicial record for review of the zoning
decision." 5 Rezoning by initiative or referendum provides almost no
evidentiary basis for the courts, though." 6 It is therefore much more
difficult for courts to balance the policy goals underlying initiatives
and referenda with the needs of the region.
The California Supreme Court recognized this problem in Building
Industry Association v. City of Camarillo,"7 but ruled that the record
produced by an initiative would be sufficient for review. The court
ruled that a state inclusionary zoning statute, which requires that
local governments establish the need for growth control ordinances
and that the need be balanced against regional housing needs," 8
applies to initiatives. The court ruled further that initiative proponents
could establish a record through the debate on the measure in public
forums and newspapers, and through campaign materials. Proponents
may also present the housing element of the municipality's general
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plan, which is required to include plans for affordable housing.1 9
The court also ruled that initiatives need not comply with another
inclusionary zoning statute, which requires local governments to
balance their need for growth control legislation against local housing
needs, 20 and to adopt findings of factors which justify restricting
housing opportunities. The court ruled that such findings, even if
they were adopted by initiative, would not show that the electorate
2
actually did the purported balancing and consideration.1 1
c. Accommodation vs. Uncompromised Proposals
A third deficiency of direct legislation is its incompatibility with
the norms of accommodation and compromise. An initiative is placed
on the ballot as it is first written. It undergoes none of the processes
that produce refinements and amendments-no hearings, no debate,
no technical analysis by legislative counsel. After the signatures are
gathered, not even the proponents may change the wording. As a
result, voters are confronted with an all-or-nothing policy choice on

a measure which is formulated by the sponsors alone.
This process is perfectly suited for single interest groups, which
have no competing interests which need to be accommodated. Such
groups may prefer to present their unamended proposal directly to
the voters, rather than sponsor a measure before the city council
which will inevitably be amended. 22 This dislike of compromise is
reflected in an explanation of the popularity of the initiative process
by Larry Orman, the director of People For Open Space, a San
Francisco environmental group:
Those concerned with open space protection tend to see land as a
finite and dwindling resource. Since most legislative decisions are
based on compromise, most land-use actions usually result in the
loss of at least some farmland, forest or natural habitat area....
Conservation activists respond by seeking to limit these progressive
and cumulative losses of land. They often see the legislative process
as a ratchet that moves periodically, but in one direction only- toward more land development. An initiative is seen as a way to
limit the range of discretion of the compromise-oriented legislature,
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in order to protect vulnerable farming and grazing land, as well as
other environmental resources. 123

In the same way, a referendum on a rezoning action is also seen
as a method of stopping projects without the need to compromise.
Even the threat of a referendum on a zoning amendment by a city
council or county supervisors can act as a deterrent to development
proposals.
d. Participationvs. Distortion
A final dilemma is the direct vote's potential to distort the voters'
desires. Courts must often wrestle with the tension between allowing
the voters to speak out directly on a land use question, and assuring
that the vote actually reflects public opinion.
One common problem is low voter participation. Contrary to the
expectations of the Progressives, surveys of voting on statewide ballot
propositions show lower voter interest in initiatives and referenda
than in candidates for public office. Fourteen to seventeen percent' 24
of the voters do not vote for ballot propositions after voting for
candidates. Local land use propositions, however, are often highly
salient issues for voters, perhaps softening the voter dropoff effect.
On the other hand, land use propositions often target a specific
development, and therefore have their primary impact only in a small
area of town. If the impact of the initiative or referendum is too
localized, it may primarily invoke the interest of only the neighboring
residents. 25
A California appellate court appeared to be alluding to this phenomenon in Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa (Arnel
II).126 The court held that an initiative ordinance rezoning a fifty
acre plot was invalid because it was discriminatory, and it was
inconsistent with regional housing needs. In so holding, the court
noted the election statistics for the initiative. It passed 4,295 to 3,901,
but the turnout was only 22.5%. The unstated conclusion appeared
to be that a group of neighbors may have turned out disproportionately to tip the election in favor of the restrictive zoning, resulting
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124. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 74, at 86-87. Between 1970 and 1982, the average dropoff
rate on statewide ballot propositions was 1400 in California and Washington, and 17% in
Massachusetts. Id.
125. A survey of participation in Cuyahoga County, Ohio land use elections shows very
low voter turnouts. Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 432.
126. 126 Cal. App. 3d 330, 178 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1981).
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in a de facto neighborhood veto. Voter turnout is very important to
the legitimacy of the initiative and referendum. A low turnout enables
neighbors to be overrepresented, resulting in an outcome that is
desired by the neighborhood but may not be good for the city. Low
turnout also allows the overrepresentation of higher status voters,
who tend to have the highest voting rate. If higher status voters own
the most expensive property in the locality, they may be more likely
to vote to exclude housing projects aimed at persons of lower
income.127
A second problem is the often poor quality of the drafting of
initiatives. As discussed in the previous section, initiative measures
cannot be changed once the signature gathering process has begun.
There is no method to cure drafting errors or clarify the measure's
language. As a result, voters often find themselves voting on measures
which may not actually accomplish what the proponents intended.
The courts often face the dilemma of when to construe the initiatives
to save them from faulty drafting, and when to invalidate them
altogether.
One 1986 California case shows the lengths that courts in that
state will go to save a faulty initiative. In Patterson v. County of
Tehama,18 the voters of that agricultural county passed an initiative
which attempted to abolish virtually all land use planning in the
county. The "Landowners Bill of Rights" prohibited a long list of
land controls by unspecified "public entities." The intent of the
proponents was to abolish government land use controls, substitute
economics as the primary land use regulator, and establish that the
"right to acquire and own property and ... use it as the owner
chooses, so long as the use harms nobody, is a natural right."' 129
While the dissenting judge would have voided the entire initiative
due to the clear intent to keep out state-mandated land use controls,
the court majority saved portions of the initiative. For instance, the
court saved parts that abolished any government controls on the type
and size of housing, shape of buildings, and fence requirements by
construing the provisions to abolish only aesthetic regulation. This
was a creative construction of the ordinance, which never explicitly
referred to aesthetic zoning.

127.
128.
129.

See S. VERBA & N. Nm,

PARTICIPATION IN AtMRICA (1972).

184 Cal. App. 3d 1546, 229 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1986).
Id. at 1558, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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The court recited that initiatives are to be construed liberally to
ascertain the intent of the electorate. The opinion also notes, however,
that "while the courts have an obligation to interpret an ambiguous
initiative ordinance to save its intent, they have no authority to
emasculate its intent in order to save it from itself .... The voters
of Tehama County cannot impede laws passed by the Legislature
requiring the county to plan for the development of private prop30
erty."1
A third and related problem is the low level of voter information,
comprehension, and deliberation. Voters typically get their information about ballot proposition from the mass media.'' In smaller
cities and towns newspaper coverage is the most influential medium.
Informal discussion among residents, so important in the town meeting
process, is rarely influential on all but the most salient initiatives and
referenda.' 32 Few voters read the text of the ordinance itself, and even
fewer comprehend the legal significance of the measure. Some states
require government prepared voter handbooks on ballot propositions,
but these are generally unreadable to anyone with less than a college
education. 33 The lack of information and discussion leaves voters
vulnerable to manipulation by advertising campaigns, which often
134
reduce complex issues to slogans.
The San Diego campaign to restrict development of its urban
reserve, for example, used the slogan "No L.A.-Yes on A.' ' 35 The
Alameda County campaign to ratify the Las Positas new town
proposal featured simple slogans such as "Yes on A-We Need More
Housing."'' The Kauai building height restriction initiative used such
slogans as "Vote X for Lowrise Kauai.' 1 37 While not necessarily
deceptive, a campaign of slogans is simplistic, and avoids the specifics
of the proposed measure itself. The evidence suggests that voters are

130. Id. at 1568, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
131. Mueller, Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Patterns and Trends in California, 63
Am. POL. Sci. Rav. 1197-1213 (1969).
132. See CAPlnoRNuA PoLL 7904, Tm FmLw INsrrrtE , Nov. 12-19, 1979. While many voters

discuss the ballot with others, few consider discussions their most important source of information. Id.
133. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 74, at 138-39. Surveys of the readability of voter
handbooks find that the reading level of the official description of the proposal is at the third
year of college in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, and at the second year of postgraduate
work in California and Oregon. The readability of the actual proposition is no better-at the
third year of college level in California. Id.
134. Id. at 146-51.
135. G. CoLauRN, supra note 96, at 8.
136. Longhini, supra note 28, at 14.
137. Thirty Voters v. Doi, 599 P.2d 286, 289 (Haw. 1979).
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essentially casting broad policy mandates without a commitment to
the specific proposal itself.
C. The People vs. The Planners
The use of the initiative and referendum to decide land use matter
implicates another classic dilemma of 20th century governance: When
should the people and their representatives decide directly and when
should the experts decide? This battle has been fought throughout
the century between the advocates of scientific management and the
proponents of popular decisionmaking. On the one hand, support
for the idea of unchecked delegation of important government decisions to trained experts has long since peaked, and is in some
disfavor today. During several periods of the 20th century, however,
this idea was promoted as a technique to remedy a wide range of
social problems. In the New Deal era, for example, proponents of a
strong federal administrative structure believed that a strong and
independent force of expert administrative officials could determine
what policies were in the "public interest," and successfully implement them. 138 With the loss of faith in government in the 1960s and
1970s came a new skepticism that there is a single objective public
interest. Instead, government actions are seen as involving a choice
between competing economic interests and social values. "Experts"
are seen as no better equipped to make those choices as anyone else.
Leaving decisions to experts allows them to mask their policy preferences under the guise of objective scientific management. 139 On
the other hand, many of the decisions of government have grown
too complicated to be resolved by generalists. Just as the setting of
railroad rates was seen as an appropriate task for specialized commissions as early as the late 19th century, today's decisions on nuclear
plant safety or securities regulations are left to expert commissions.
Most American zoning systems are set up to mediate this dilemma.
Proposed zoning amendments, variances, conditional use permits,
etc., must be considered by both a popularly elected city council or
county board, and by an appointed planning commission.14 0 Both
138.

J. LANDIs, Tm ADmImSTRATIVE PROCESS 46 (1938). Landis wrote that the broad

delegation of powers to administrative agencies resulted from the inabilitly of traditional
branches of government to solve pressing problems: "The administrative process is, in essence,

our generation's answer to the inadequacy of the judicial and the legislative processes." Id.
139. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HAXv. L. REv. 1667,
1682-85 (1975).
140. D. HAGUAN, URBAN PLA ING AND LAND DEvELoPimNT CONTROL LAW 46-47 (1975).
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bodies have the assistance of expert planners. Experts have become
more necessary as land use decisions have tended to grow in complexity since the early days of zoning. Some states have begun to
41
mandate both a comprehensive general plan to guide zoning decisions
and environmental impact statements to gauge the impact proposed
developments will have on traffic, noise, pollution, and other facets
42
of city life.
The use of the initiative and referendum to decide land use
questions raises problems because the direct vote circumvents these
elaborate land use planning systems. The task of resolving the competing values of expert planning and direct decisionmaking has fallen
to state courts. With the exception of New Jersey, which has banned
the use of the initiative and referendum for zoning decisions, 143 no
state legislature has explicitly laid out procedures for the direct vote
on land use questions. Instead, the state courts have been forced to
reconcile two competing provisions-the general authorization of the
local initiative and referendum and the state zoning enabling statute.
State legislatures, in enacting zoning statutes, assumed that zoning
would be undertaken by the local governing body. As a result, the
statutorily mandated procedures are appropriate only for such bodies.
The courts must first determine whether the two provisions can be
reconciled to allow a direct vote. If so, the court must then sort out
which procedural protections to apply to initiatives and referenda,
and which to ignore.
Several post-Eastlakestate court decisions have found the planning
process and direct democracy irreconcilable. In Leonard v. City of
Bothell the Washington Supreme Court found that a zoning amendment could not be subject to a referendum because the voters lacked
the sophistication to decide the matter. 44 "Amendments to the zoning
code or rezone decisions require an informed and intelligent choice
by individuals who possess the expertise to consider the total economic, social, and physical characteristics of the community. Respondent's planning commission and city council normally possess the
necessary expertise to make these difficult decisions."'' 45 The court
also emphasized the need to evaluate a 160 page environmental impact

141.
hensive
142.
143.
144.
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statement for the project in question, along with six appendices and
102 comment letters, a task it doubted would be or could be undertaken by the voters.
The Idaho Supreme Court likewise held that the initiative cannot
be used to enact a zoning ordinance because of the inability to
comply with the detailed procedures required by the State Local
146
Planning Act of 1975. In Gumprecht v. City of Coeur D'Alene
the court invalidated an initiative which would have set building
height limits on all lakefront property in the city, finding "it impossible for initiative zoning to comply with these legislative mandates."

147

A California court has ruled that an initiative zoning statute is
invalid unless it complies with the locality's general plan. In deBottari
v. City Council, an appellate court allowed the city of Norco to keep
a referendum off the ballot which would have repealed a recent
zoning amendment, but left intact a conforming general plan amendment.'14 In a strong upholding of the state's general plan requirement,
the court states: "Judicial deference to the electoral process does not
compel judicial apathy towards patently invalid legislative acts ....
[T]he requirement of consistency is the linchpin of California land
use and development laws, it is the principle which infused the
concept of planned growth with the force of law. We are not
persuaded that this principle must now be sacrificed on the altar of
an invalid referendum."'' 49 The California experience shows that direct
democracy and planning principles need not be mutually exclusive.
III.

THE PEOPLE AND THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY

A. Historical Tensions Between Majority Rule and Property
Rights
The clash between majority sentiment and private property rights,
a fundamental tension in today's land use votes, is a conflict which
resonates throughout American history. In fact, concern over this
very conflict in the late 18th century helped to create support for a
new constitution and bill of rights. Had he been faced with the issue

146.
147.
148.
149.

661 P.2d 1214 (Idaho 1983).
Id. at 1217.
171 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 217 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1985).
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James Madison may well have been opposed to entrusting land
development decisions to the voters as inconsistent with the property
rights which had been guaranteed by the Constitution. Majoritarian
forces would have welcomed the idea more warmly.
Madison and the other framers of the Constitution acted in response to the debtors' rebellion which arose in the 1780s. 150 The crisis
was founded on a chain of debt which reached from New England
farmers to their merchants, and from the merchants to their British
suppliers. When the British exporters called in their debts from the
merchants, the merchants in turn pressured the farmers to settle their
accounts, in cash. The farmers, who were accustomed to paying their
debts in agricultural surplus, resisted their creditors. Many of the
farmers found themselves imprisoned for nonpayment of even small
debts. Fear of being jailed or losing their land stirred up the farmers,
and led to a polarization of the agricultural and commercial classes.' 51
Farmers controlled some legislatures, and those bodies responded
with laws highly destructive of credit values. Private rights in property
were attacked by stay laws, legal tender laws, and other measures
meant to relieve the debtors. Moreover, open rebellion had broken
out in some states. Shays' Rebellion, the farmer's battle to seize
control of the federal arsenal in Springfield, Massachusetts, epitomized the radical state of the farmer's insurrection.
Leaders of the commercial and professional sectors worried that
the farmers would seek the cancellation of debts and redistribution
of property.1 52 Although these redistribution goals were primarily
found in the fears of opponents, and not in fact, the prospect of a
loss of property rights inspired calls for the drafting of a new
constitution. 53 The commercial elite feared mob rule, either by the
democratic attacks on capital by semi-sovereign state legislatures or
15 4
by extra-governmental rebellion.
The framers responded by writing a constitution that reflected the
theme that republican institutions are not sufficient to guarantee
individual rights when sharp divisions appear in society. The overall
structure of the government was, in part, derived from Madison's
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Federalist No. 10. It was intended to prevent a tyranny of the
majority not only by guarantees of individual rights, but by empowering a federal level of government, thereby preventing individual
factions from dominating the republic. The most direct response to
the agrarian rebellion came in Article I, section 10, which provided
that "No State shall ... emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but
gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill
of Attainder, . . or law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."'1 55
Chief Justice John Marshall, writing passionately on the contract
clause in his dissent in Ogden v. Saunders, reflected the federalists'
outrage at the majoritarian attacks on property:
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor,
of interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to every
man, touches the interest of all, and controls the conduct of every
individual in those things which he supposes to be proper for his
own exclusive management, had been used to such an excess by the
State legislatures, as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse of
society, and destroy all confidence between man and man. The
mischief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair
commercial intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to
sap the morals of the people, and destroy the sanctity of private
faith. To guard against the continuance of the evil was an object
of deep interest with all the truly wise, as well as the virtuous, of
this great community, and was one of the important benefits expected from a reform of the government.5 6
Other protections restricted the new federal government's authority
to tamper with private property. The fifth amendment requires that
"No person shall ... be deprived of ... property, without due
process of law .... -17 The due process clause has been interpreted
as deriving from the Magna Carta's "guarantees against the oppressions and usurpations" of the royal prerogative. The clause was seen
by the Supreme Court, in an early opinion, as "a restraint on the
legislative as well as the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress [or the states]
free to make any process 'due process of law,' by its mere will."' 58

Even in the transition from monarchy to representative democracy,
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early American leaders recognized the need for checks on majority
rule over the ownership of property.
The fifth amendment takings clause-"nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation," adds a further
protection of property. 159 Both the government power of eminent
domain and the practice of compensation were already well established in colonial times.' 60 The takings clause may have been inspired
by recent abuses in that power, however, such as the confiscation of
the property of English loyalists and the cancellation of debts owed

to British subjects by the tobacco states. 6 ' Again, the framers insulated property ownership from excesses of majoritarian democracy.
B.

The Property/Democracy Conflict in State Court Decisions

The Supreme Court attempted in its Eastlake ruling to resolve the
dilemma of property rights against direct democracy which is posed
by the zoning referendum. The Court held that the use of the initiative
and referendum to make land use policy satisfies federal constitutional requirements. 162 Due process standards are met as long as the
measure meets the test of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,163 that it not
be arbitrary or unreasonable, and that it has a substantial relation
to the public welfare.164 But again, Eastlake failed to resolve the
tension underlying zoning by direct vote, and thereby limited the
influence of the opinion on state courts which would later face the
issue.
The Court's failure is again rooted in its one-sided portrayal of
the direct democracy process in relation to the rights of property.
The Eastlake court responded to the due process question with an
image of the city referendum as an updated version of the New
England town meeting. The voters, said the Court, are no more
likely than the city council to act unreasonably or arbitrarily. When
they do act arbitrarily, the Euclid standard will allow a court to
invalidate the resulting ordinance. The Court viewed voters and the
legislative body of the city as equally capable of rendering a fair
decision. It viewed the voters' decision as subject to invalidation by

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
E. PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DoMAIN 72 (1987).
Id. at 74.
Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 676-77.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 676-77.

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
the courts should the measure unreasonably destroy a landowner's
property rights. This image is appealing to democratically minded
jurists. A number of state courts have responded to the Eastlake
model of electoral responsibility with decisions upholding the use
of the direct vote on zoning amendments. 165
At the same time the opposing image of the mob bent on destroying
private property rights remains powerful. As many states have restricted zoning by initiative and referendum as have upheld its use
in the last eleven years.' The courts in these states see the democratic
resolution of zoning disputes as inevitably conflicting with the orderly
protection of property. These courts have invalidated or restricted
voter zoning in three ways. First, some have defined zoning as off
limits to the electorate because of its "adjudicative" nature. Second,
some have held that initiatives and referenda conflict with the procedures established in state zoning enabling statutes. And third, some
have invalidated petitions which have not strictly complied with state
signature gathering requirements. None of these holdings, however,
directly discusses the underlying conflict of democracy and property.
This conflict, having been ignored and finessed by the Supreme Court
in Eastlake, must now be satisfactorily resolved by state legislatures
and courts.
1.

The Adjudication/LegislationDistinction

The state courts' most prevalent method of determining whether
the initiative and referendum are available on land use matters is
also the most formalistic. The courts characterize the land use action
as either "legislative," which can be decided by direct vote, or
"adjudicative," which cannot be decided by the voters. In the eleven
years since Eastlake was decided the state courts have split on how
to characterize zoning amendments. At least four have classified
rezoning as legislative, 16 7 while two have called rezonings administrative. 6 Another state, Michigan, has characterized zoning amend-
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of a referendum, 69 but adjudicative
ments as legislative for the purpose
1 0
for the purpose of an initiative.
The distinction derives from early 20th century Supreme Court
determinations of the due process required in municipal action. In
Londoner v. Denver,17 1 the Court required that a taxpayer receive a
variety of procedural protections when the Denver Board of Public
Works imposed an assessment on him and his neighbors for street
paving. The court found the taxpayer entitled to a hearing, with
prior notice, an opportunity to be heard, and right to oral argument.
Yet, in the subsequent case of Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State
Board of Equalization,'72 the Court found no procedural requirements necessary, when the Colorado State Board of Equalization
increased the valuation of all taxable property in Denver by forty
percent. The difference betwen the two situations, explained the BiMetallic Court, lies in the number of affected persons. When "a
relatively small number of persons" is concerned, the government
action is more likely to be adjudicative, and trial-type protections
are needed. 7 3 "Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few
people," however, it is impractical for all affected persons to get a
hearing. 74 Furthermore, the Court said, such a large scale action is
a legislative decision in which the constraints of representative democracy act as checks on the government, to the protection of the
75
affected citizens.'

Two other rules have followed from the Bi-Metallic distinction.
First, courts have traditionally applied a lax standard of review of
legislative decisions, while applying a stricter scrutiny of adjudicative
decisions. 76 Second, municipal law has allowed the electorate to
make legislative policy through the initiative and referendum, but
has made adjudicative decisions off limits to the voters.
The structure of local governments makes this distinction between
legislative and adjudicative matters unclear. Unlike the federal and
state governments, local governments lack a clear separation of
functions. The local legislative body acts as legislator, as judge, and
as administrator of its laws at various times. Perhaps nothing makes
169.
170.
171.
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173.
174.
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this multiple function clearer than zoning. Formally, amendments to the
zoning map are accomplished through ordinances, enacted by the
legislative body of the municipality. But realistically, the rezoning
process has elements of both legislative policymaking and adjudication of individual interests.
A minority of states has adopted the view that rezoning is quasijudicial, and hence off limits to the initiative and referendum process. 177 These states, led by the 1973 Oregon decision of Fasano v.
Board of County Commissioners of Washington County,78 require
additional procedural protections for landowners and stricter judicial
review of decisions. They view zoning map changes as primarily
affecting the landowner within the zone and the surrounding neighbors. Such a zoning change lacks the citywide policy implications to
be truly regarded as a legislative act. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice Brennan, cited this concern in his Eastlake dissent, noting
"the obvious difference between the adoption of a comprehensive
citywide plan by legislative action and the decision of particular issues
' 79
involving specific uses of specific parcels.'
Even large-scale rezonings have been held to be quasi- judicial,
and off limits to the electorate. Shortly after Eastlake was decided,
the Washington Supreme Court ruled in Leonard v. City of Bothell 0
that the rezoning of a 141 acre parcel to allow construction of a
regional shopping center was not subject to referendum. The Washington court ruled that a rezoning is "an adjudication between the
rights sought by the proponents and those claimed by the opponents
of the zoning change. The parties whose interests are affected are
readily identifiable. Although important questions of public policy
may permeate a zoning amendment, the decision has a far greater
impact on one group of citizens than on the public generally."''
Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court invalidated an initiative which
would have set building height limits for all buildings near the Lake
Coeur D'Alene shoreline. The court, ruling in the case of Gumprecht
v. City of Coeur D'Alene,1 did not resort to the legislative/adjudicative classification. Instead, it strictly upheld the application of
procedural protections recently enacted by the Idaho legislature which
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created trial-type procedures for rezonings. The Washington and
Idaho rulings are remarkable for the courts' adherence to the adjudicative concept even in zoning actions having clear policy impact
on the entire locality.
The states which have adopted the legislative classification of
rezoning want to encourage the use of direct democracy. They see
the lesser protections of the initiative and referendum process as
sufficient to meet due process needs. The leading case on this view
is the California Supreme Court ruling of Arnel Development Co.
v. City of Costa Mesa.83 In that case Arnel persuaded the city to
rezone its fifty acre plot to allow the construction of 127 single
family homes and 539 apartments intended for moderate income
tenants. A neighboring homeowners' group opposing the development
sponsored an initiative, subsequently passed by the voters, which
downzoned the property to a single family residential zone.
The court found that the political process provided procedures

satisfactory to affected landowners. The landowner may seek a
variance from the city or seek judicial invalidation of the zoning as
arbitrary and unreasonable. Most importantly, the court stated:
[L]andowners have the same opportunity as their opponents to
present their case to the electorate.
Although from the landowner's view a "hearing" before the
electorate may be less satisfactory than a hearing before a planning
commission or city council, as a practical matter the initiative is
unlikely to be employed in matters which could fairly be characterized as adjudicative in character. An initiative petition requires valid
signatures of ten percent of the registered voters. (Elec. Code, 4011)
Having accomplished this feat, the proponents must then be prepared to wage an expensive campaign to persuade the majority of
the voters to support the measure. In consequence of these requirements, the initiative can be and is employed to support or oppose
major projects which affect hundreds or thousands of persons and
often present questions of policy concerning the quality of life and
the future development of the city; it is not likely to be employed
in matters which affect only an individual landowner and raise no
policy issues.
The spectre of a few voters imposing their selfish interests upon
an objecting city and region has no basis in reality.'8
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Decisions upholding direct voter zoning in Missouri, Colorado, Flor85
ida, and Ohio follow the Arnel rationale.
The Arnel electoral due process argument, however, runs counter
to American experience with direct democracy. Landowners do not
have an equivalent opportunity to be heard and receive a just decision
when forced to speak to the electorate rather than to the city council.
The right to speak means little when the electorate has difficulty
understanding the technical, legal, planning, and policy issues involved. Landowners, unless they mount expensive campaigns to saturate the electorate with catchy slogans and persuasive information,
cannot be assured that they can express their case to the public.
While an under-informed public may be an acceptable decisionmaking
body for a broadly applicable issue of public policy, it cannot satisfy
even minimal due process for the resolution of an individual zoning
dispute. This theme was the basis of Justice Powell's brief dissent in
Eastlake. He wrote that "here the only issue concerned the status
of a single small parcel owned by a single 'person'. This procedure,
affording no realistic opportunity for the affected person to be heard,
even by the electorate, is fundamentally unfair."' 86
Moreover, the second Arnel argument that the initiative and referendum will only be used on important issues of policy is empirically
incorrect. Direct votes are often forced on relatively insignificant
rezonings of small single tracts of property. Neighboring property
owners may be sufficiently upset over a rezoning to collect signatures
on a petition, and to campaign vigorously for the measure.
The common theme of all these decisions is the notion that the
act of enacting a zoning amendment is partly legislative, a generally
applicable rule-making exercise, and partly adjudicative, a determination of the rights of specific parties based on findings of fact,
Some rezonings fall more on the policy end of the continuum. Some
fall more toward the judicial end. In general, rezonings of big areas
tend to be more legislative than rezonings of small areas. Rezonings
of a single plot tend to be more adjudicative than rezonings of
multiple plots. Can courts draw a line between primarily adjudicative
rezonings and primarily legislative rezonings based on these factors?
Justice Stevens' Eastlake dissent advocates that states make such
a distinction.
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I have no doubt about the validity of the initiative or the referendum

as an appropriate method of deciding questions of community
policy. I think it is equally clear that the popular vote is not an
acceptable method of adjudicating the rights of individual litigants

.

.

.. If the [general public interest] aspect of the controversy were

predominant, the referendum would be an acceptable procedure.
On the other hand, when the record indicates without contradiction

that there is no threat to the general public interest in preserving
the city's plan-as it does in this case ... I think the case should

be treated as one in which it is essential that the private property
owner be given a fair opportunity to have his claim determined on
187

the merits.
Stevens does concede that the development of a multi-family apartment in a small city like Eastlake could fall into the category of a
primarily legislative decision. He sees it as also likely, though, that
project, with only
the community at large would be indifferent to the
188
the landowner and neighbors directly concerned.
The California Supreme Court declined to make such a distinction
in Arnel. The court rejected the criterion of size as a determining
factor, arguing that "the rezoning of a 'relatively small' parcel,
especially when done by initiative, may well signify a fundamental
change in city land use policy.

'

189 It

resisted requiring courts to make

case-by-case determinations of which rezonings are adjudicative and
which are legislative, preferring to retain the "generic classifications"
of zoning amendments as legislative. 190 The Arnel ruling can only be
justified on grounds of judicial economy, and of furthering a state
policy of encouraging use of the initiative and referendum. Arnel
provides no fair solution for the voter rezoning which is not a major
policy change, but forces a small landowner to appeal to the electorate
for a proper resolution of his property rights.
2.

Conflict Between Voter Zoning and State Enabling Statutes

Rezoning by initiative or referendum can be seen as an end-run
around carefully enacted procedures for zoning decisions. No hearings
are needed, no reports of professional planners, no amendments and
compromise, no testimony by the affected landowner, and no city

187. Id.at 693-94.
188. Id.at 694.
189. Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 523, 620 P.2d 565,
572, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904, 911 (1980).
190. Id.
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council members are held accountable for a controversial decision.
On the other hand, voter rezoning can be seen as a new development
in land use law, not technically within the letter of the state mandated
procedures, but well within the American tradition of democratic
policymaking.
State zoning enabling statutes invariably require a host of procedural protections by the city councils, county board, planning commissions, and zoning commissions entrusted with the zoning power.19'
Only one state legislature, however, has enacted legislation specifically
aimed at zoning by the electorate (and that state, New Jersey, banned
the practice). 192 Zoning by the electorate literally conflicts with the
enabling statutes in virtually all the other states. This conflict has
forced state courts to decide whether they can construe zoning by
initiative and referendum as consistent with the state grant of power,
or as inherently inconsistent and therefore void.
One debate is over who should zone: only elected representatives
and appointed commissions, or voters as well as government officials?
The supreme courts of Washington and New Mexico took the position
that when their state enabling statutes gave zoning power to city
councils and county boards, the statutes gave exclusive power to
those bodies. 93 Neither court, however, cited any convincing evidence
that the legislatures of their states had ever actually considered whether
zoning might be done by direct voting, and had made a decision on
voter zoning one way or the other. Instead, the courts relied purely on
their interpretations of the wording of the statutes, which fails to
persuasively resolve the due process question.
This line of reasoning probably reflects the courts' belief that the
voters are inferior to government bodies in making consistent and
rational zoning decisions. As noted in the previous section, voters
lack the expertise built up by city councils and planning commissions
over their consideration of great numbers of zoning proposals. It is
unlikely that the electorate will ever decide a sufficient number of
zoning matters to gain a similar level of expertise. Evidence also
shows a more casual and less reasoned decisionmaking process on
the part of the voters. As one commentator summarized the problem,
the public cannot "enjoy the requisite deliberative mediation" that

See D. MANDELKER, supra note 141, at 77-95.
192. N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55 D-62(b) (west Supp. 1987).
193. Leonard v. City of Bothell, 557 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Wash. 1976); Westgate Families v.
County Clerk, 667 P.2d 453, 455 (N.M. 1983).
191.
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can be expected from legislative and appointed government bodies.
"Legislation by plebiscite is not and cannot be a deliberative process
...
there is no genuine debate or discussion, no individual commitment to a consistent or fair course of conduct."'' 9 4 Property rights
appear to be safer in the hands of a city council than a group of
voters.
The second debate is over how zoning should be done: what
procedural requirements are necessary to safeguard the rights of
affected property owners as well as the interests of the general public?
Two California Supreme Court rulings, separated by almost fifty
years, best illustrate this debate. In the 1929 case of Hurst v. City
of Burlingame,195 the court found zoning by initiative "hopelessly
inconsistent' '1 96 with the state's zoning act. If the Burlingame city
council had adopted a zoning ordinance, the court stated, the city
council and the city planning commission would have been required
by the state statute to hold public hearings on the proposed zoning.
Without the hearings, the zoning ordinance would be invalid. "It is
equally clear that the infirmity would not be cured by the purported
adoption of the ordinance by the electors of the city under the
initiative law." 97
Hurst was overruled in 1976, just months after the Eastlake decision, by Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore.98
First, the court determined that the legislature never intended its
notice and hearing requirements to apply to zoning initiatives. 99
Second, it determined that the legislature could not enact any procedures which would prevent the electorate from exercising its right
of initiative, a right guaranteed by the state constitution. The court
stated:
Although the Legislature can specify the manner in which general
law cities enact ordinance restricting land use, legislation which
permits council action but effectively bars initiative action may run
afoul of the [constitutional right of initiative]. Thus the notice and
hearing provisions of the state zoning law, if interpreted to bar
initiative land use ordinances, would be of doubtful constitutionality; all such doubt dissolves in the light of an interpretation which

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Sager, supra note 59, at 1414-15.
207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929).
Id. at 141.
Id.
18 Cal. 3d 582, 596, 557 P.2d 473, 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1976).
Id. at 594, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
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limits those requirements to ordinances enacted by city councils.200
Since that pivotal decision the California courts have been faced
with the task of deciding which state-mandated planning requirements
are to apply to initiatives and referenda. In 1986, it ruled in Building
Industry Association v. City of Camarillo that statutory requirements
which do not "effectively bar" the initiative are applicable; those
which place an "insurmountable obstacle in the path of the initiative

process and effectively give legislative bodies the only authority to
enact this sort of zoning ordinance" are invalid as applied to initiatives. 201 In this case, the court found applicable a. 1980 statute that
establishes a presumption that growth limitation ordinances adversely
affect regional housing needs, placing the burden of proof on the
locality to show that the ordinance is necessary to promote the public
health, safety, and welfare. This requirement does not effectively bar
such initiatives, as long as the proponents are given an opportunity
to intervene in the legal action. On the other hand, the court held a
second statute inapplicable to initiatives. That statute, which requires
a balancing of public service needs against regional housing needs
and the making of such findings before adoption of a growth control
ordinance, could not be done by initiative, according to the court.
Even after Eastlake dismissed the federal due process concerns of
voter zoning, a surprising number of state courts have followed Hurst
in deciding that zoning and the initiative process are "hopelessly
inconsistent." Besides the Washington and New Mexico rulings,
courts in Idaho, 20 2 West Virginia, 20 3 and Texas 2°4 have cited the due
process requirements of their statutes as preventing voter zoning. The
Idaho court, for instance, ruled in Gumprecht v. City of Coeur
D'Alene that a building height limit initiative proposal was invalid
for failure to comply with the state's 1975 Local Planning Act. The
Act requires advisory and informational meetings and hearings, a
comprehensive planning process, notice to interested parties, and an
opportunity to appear. The 1982 amendments require approval or
denial of rezoning to be based upon articulable written standards,
accompanied by a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of
law, a verbatim transcript, and minutes of proceedings. Such pro-

200. Id. at 594-95, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
201. Building Indus. Ass'n v. City of Camarillo, 41 Cal. 3d 810, 825, 718 P.2d 68, 76,
226 Cal. Rptr. 81, 89 (1986).
202. Gumprecht v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 661 P.2d 1214 (Idaho 1983).
203. State ex rel. MacQueen v. City of Dunbar, 278 S.E.2d 636, 638 (V. Va. 1981).
204. San Pedro N., Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 562 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
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cedural requirements, designed to guarantee a fair hearing as well as
facilitate judicial review, cannot be undertaken by the electorate.
Therefore, ruled the court, "the comprehensiveness of zoning legislation in Idaho leaves no room for direct legislation by electors

through an initiative election ....

"205

While the holdings of these courts may appear excessively harsh,
they may not preclude voters from making land use decisions. The
cases primarily interpret their state statutes. Therefore, state legislatures could draw statutory procedures which would be more appropriate to the initiative and referendum process.
Four states, California, 20 6 Colorado, 20 7 Florida, 208 and Missouri,20 9
have found their state procedural requirements not to apply to direct
zoning legislation. Upon finding that the initiative and referendum
are powers reserved by the people, these courts require only that
constitutional due process standards be met. State procedural require-

ments, having been designed for zoning by representative bodies, are
deemed inapplicable to direct voter zoning. No procedural requirements beyond the Euclid standard are required. The courts see the
election campaign as providing ample opportunity for a public hearing in the zoning issue. The Colorado Supreme Court, in Margolis
v. District Court, wrote that "The election campaign, the debate and
airing of opposing opinions, supplant a public hearing prior to the
' 210
adoption of an ordinance by the municipal governing body.
These decisions create a wide procedural gap between legislative
rezoning and electoral rezoning. The very same rezoning decision can
be accomplished by the local legislative body, adhering to a long list
of state and locally mandated procedures, or by the electorate,
adhering only to majority rule and procedures for qualifying the
petition. Given the historical tension between democracy and property
rights, this procedural gap calls out for a new legislatively enacted
set of procedures appropriate to the electoral process.

205. Gumprecht, 661 P.2d at 1217.
206. Associate Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 594, 557 P.2d 473,
479, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 47 (1976). See also Note, The Need for Accommodation in Growth
Control Ordinances: Associated Homebuilders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 12 U.S.F. L. REv. 357 (1977).
207. Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297, 305 (Colo. 1981).
208. Florida Land Co. v. City of winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170, 172-73 (Fla. 1983).
209. State ex rel. Hickman v. City Council, 690 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Mo. App. 1985).
210. Margolis, 638 P.2d at 305 (quoting in part Meridian Dev. Co. v. Edison Township,
91 N.J. Super. 310, 220 A.2d 121 (1966) and Associate Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591,
557 P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976)).
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3.

Technical Requirements for Petition Qualification

A third method courts have employed to protect property rights
is to uphold statutory requirements for the qualification of the
petition for initiative or referendum. The courts confront a dual
responsibility. First, they must protect the right of citizens to qualify
measures for the ballot. Problems frequently occur as the citizen
proponents often lack experience in the procedures of writing an
initiative or referendum, gathering signatures, and presenting the
petition to the local government for qualification. Second, the courts
must protect the often inattentive electorate from misleading ballot
proposals which are presented to them for their signature or for their
vote.
Some courts view "substantial compliance" with statutory requirements as sufficient. This reflects an acknowledgement of local activists as amateurs, who will often stray from the technical requirements
imposed by state codes. A California court of appeals, faced with
an initiative petition which had not strictly complied with two requirements, explained the theory. On one hand, courts will "apply
a liberal construction" to the power of initiative and referendum so
that the right cannot improperly be annulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the direct vote, the courts will preserve
that power. On the other hand, "where petition deficiencies threaten
the proper operation of the election process, refusal to file the petition
has been judicially upheld . ...ITihe statutes designed to protect the
elector from confusing or misleading information should be enforced
so as to guarantee the integrity of the process." ' 211 Application of
this general standard leaves courts wide discretion to determine which
requirements must be enforced. That California court, for example,
refused to invalidate a petition for failing to carry the statutorily
mandated caption "Referendum Petition Protesting Adoption of
Ordinance 85-38." It found the petition invalid, however, for failing
to include the complete text of the ordinance in the petition, because
the signers were not given a full legal description of the property at
issue. 212

211. Chase v. Brooks, 187 Cal. App. 3d 657, 663, 232 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69 (quoting in part
Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d 473, 477, 135
Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976)).
212. Id. at 664, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
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The courts of Ohio, with one exception, have required strict
compliance rather than substantial compliance. When a legislature
enacts detailed procedural requirements for qualifying a referendum
or initiative, it often sets a trap for the unwary citizen activist with
few corresponding benefits to the electorate and affected landowners.
Allowing substantial compliance helps to ameliorate this problem,
while mandating strict compliance exacerbates it. Four Ohio cases
illustrate the potential for absurdity. In State ex rel. Griffin v.
Krumholt, 2 3 the state supreme court invalidated a petition which
carried the warning: "Notice: Whoever knowingly signs this petition
more than once, signs a name other than his own or signs when not
a legal voter, is liable for prosecution.' '214 The petition was invalidated
for failure to carry the less comprehensive, but statutorily required,
warning: "The penalty for election falsification is imprisonment for
or a fine of not more than one thousand
not more than six months
' 21 5
both.
or
dollars,
In Shelly & Sands v. Franklin County Board of Elections, '6 the
court invalidated a petition containing a very dry and technical "Brief
Summary of the Proposal" for a referendum on the rezoning of a
portion of a sand and gravel quarry. The court found that the
summary was misleading for failing to state that the remainder of
the 106 acre parcel would continue to be zoned for quarry uses. The
statement did have a correct legal description of the rezoning action
up for referendum, though. Moreover, the statement was so technical
that it is hard to envision a voter actually reading it, let alone basing
his or her vote on it. Likewise, the court held in a 1976 case that a
petition was invalid for failing to show that the circulators of the
petition were placed under oath, 2 7 and in another 1976 case invalidated a referendum petition which inadvertantly included a rezoning
which had been denied by the city council. 21 8 Other states have
219
followed the strict compliance doctrine as well.
One Ohio court decision allowed substantial compliance, but that
case can be explained by the principle of estoppel. In Nunnecker v.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

435 N.E.2d 1110 (Ohio 1982).
Id. at 1111.
Id.
465 N.E.2d 883 (Ohio 1984).
State ex rel. Evergreen Co. v. Board of Elections, 356 N.E.2d 716 (Ohio 1976).
State ex rel. Schultz v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections, 357 N.E.2d 1079 (Ohio

1976).
219.

See, e.g., Save Our County Coalition v. Wittenstein, 351 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. App.

1977); In re Initiative Petition, 718 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1986); Cottonwood Dev. v. Foothills

Area Coalition of Tucson, Inc., 653 P.2d 694 (Ariz. 1982).
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Murdock, an appellate court allowed a referendum petition with
four technical defects to stand, after the citizen proponents had
received an erroneous referendum form from an employee of the
220
county board of elections.
Strict upholding of some legislative requirements may be of dubious
help to the voters. The courts should take notice of the fact that
virtually all voters get their information on ballot proposals from
intermediate sources, such as newspapers, campaign material, or voter
handbooks. Strict legal descriptions of the property involved, or of
the zoning amendment are of little use to the electorate. A correct
legal wording may not be important to the court, either, if the
proponents' intent is clear.
IV. REFORMS: THE ACCOMMODATION OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND
LAND USE POLICY

Direct democracy on land use matters raises a threat to representative democracy, comprehensive land use planning, and the rights
of property. It places the people in contention with the politicians,
the planners, and the owners of property. These tensions raised by
direct democracy are old, even older than the republic. The dilemma
has not been effectively resolved by the Supreme Court. Its Eastlake
opinion exalted the initiative and referendum without reconciling
the opposing considerations. The dilemma has not been effectively
resolved by the state courts. Their opinions since Eastlake have either
been excessively restrictive of direct votes, or excessively permissive
and blind to its problems. The dilemma has not been effectively
resolved by state legislatures. Although the use of the initiative and
referendum has escalated in the past two decades, no state has enacted
a system that integrates the unique features of direct democracy with
its land use policy.
The answer lies in the accommodation of the initiative and referendum with land use planning. Some sort of accommodation would
be consistent with American history. Direct democracy and representative democracy have coexisted since the beginning of the nation.
Democratic land use policymaking and comprehensive planning by
experts have also gone hand-in-hand, represented by the coexistence
of the zoning authority of both city councils and planning commissions. Democracy has also accompanied property rights. The govern-

220. 458 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio 1983).
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ment has always been able to affect property ownership, subject to
the constraints of the takings clause and due process clause.
A.

The People and the Politicians

States need to strengthen democratic control of land use policy by
acting to reconcile the best aspects of direct democracy and representative democracy. First, they should require or strongly encourage
the use of initiatives which ask the voters to make a general statement
of policy, but leave implementation of that policy to the local
legislature. Questions submitted to the voters should be short and
written in easily understandable language. The questions should express a clear and unmistakeable policy mandate. For instance, the
Camarillo growth control initiative could be revised to read: "The
City of Camarillo should restrict new building construction to the
extent necessary to prevent the overburdening of public roads, public
services, schools, and air quality." If the measure were approved by
the voters, the city council would be responsible for setting specific
criteria for determining when public services are "overburdened,"
and for enacting an appropriate limit on construction. Whenever
possible, voters should be given a range of options from which to
choose. This would avoid the all-or-nothing quality of the single
proposal initiative, and more closely simulate the choices possible
within the legislative process.
The general policy mandate offers several advantages over the
specific enactment. Such proposals would be more understandable to
the voters. Debate over the measure would center on the policy issue
involved, rather than the complex mechanics of the plan. Voter
power might actually increase as the electorate gains the ability to
send a strong mandate of support or opposition to a policy proposal.
The increase in voter power would come at the expense of single
interest group proponents, who would no longer be able to write
their agenda into law by use of the initiative. Making issues more
accessible and understandable would tend to increase voter participation as well. From the legislative standpoint, this reform would
allow a local government new flexibility to resolve a policy problem
of interest to the voters. It would take advantage of the checks of
the legislative system-drafting assistance of professionals, public
hearings, and amendments. It could also allow legislative bodies to
accommodate competing interests when doing so would not set back
policy goals. Experience shows that even local legislative bodies who
oppose a measure can be trusted to fairly implement it. The clarity
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of the voters' policy mandate should give ample direction to any
local officeholder who wants to keep his or her job.
States should enact legislation to require the use of the general
policy question initiative. Alternately, state courts could encourage
their use by raising the standard of review of traditional initiative
ordinances. As is done in California, initiative proponents should be
subjected to the same requirements as city councils to prove that
their ordinances are not arbitrary or unreasonable, are related to the
public welfare, and are consistent with regional housing needs. Courts
must guard against the use of direct democracy to bypass such
requirements. Courts should grant standing to proponents of general
policy question initiatives to challenge the legislative implementation
of successful initiatives.
Courts should also take an active role in scrutinizing initiative
proposals which involve a discriminatory impact on minority groups.
Courts should ensure that majorities do not take advantage of direct
democracy by taking away benefits that minorities have obtained
through representative democracy.
Secondly, states should uphold the right of the referendum on land
use matters. The referendum serves as the "gun behind the door"
needed to cure defects in the representative process. The right to
veto unwanted ordinances complements the right to select office
holders. The referendum carries a clear mandate and suffers from
none of the drafting problems of the enactment of specific ordinances
by initiative.
B.

The People and the Planners

States should integrate comprehensive land use planning into all
phases of the initiative and referendum process. One way to do this
is to give proponents of direct measures access to planning staff
when preparing the measures. Municipalities could provide a number
of services which would improve the quality of initiative measures.
Planners could familiarize proponents with the locality's land use
system, and help to maintain consistency with conventional planning
efforts. Lawyers could give advice on drafting and legal questions,
helping proponents to avoid the legal pitfalls which have invalidated
or weakened past measures.
While this approach may not be useful in localities where citizen
activists and government officials are at odds with each other, it
could be widely successful. Many professional planners have wel-
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comed citizen involvement in planning efforts,2 1 and would be likely
to give substantial help to proponents. At its best, the assistance of
professional planning experts could help the proponents of land use
ballot measures to more effectively achieve their policy goals, while
also ensuring consistency with local planning efforts.
A second approach, the general policy mandate initiative, would
be an even more effective method of bringing planning expertise to

direct democracy. If the local legislative body were required to
implement the initiative, it would refer proposed ordinances to planning staff, lawyers, and the planning commission for review. The
planning experts would not be bypassed in this form of the initiative.

C. The People and the Rights of Property
States should adopt protective- measures in their zoning enabling
statutes to ensure that property owners receive a similar level of due
process whether their land is the target of action by the electorate
or by the local legislative body. State legislation would guarantee the
rights of the voters to decide important land use policies. It would
also ensure that land use referenda and initiatives do not escape the
due process restrictions that bind city councils and county boards
considering the same issues.
Legislatures can make a big contribution to due process by setting
a presumptive dividing line between policy-oriented proposals, which
would be subject to initiatives and referenda, and adjudicative proposals, which would not be subject to ballot proposals. The dividing
line could be set at a certain acreage, providing that only rezonings
of, perhaps, 100 acres or more would be subject to electoral decisions.
The dividing line could categorically exclude certain projects from
initiatives and referenda, such as apartment buildings and low-income
housing projects. The goal of such a division would be to prevent
votes on actions concerning mainly the landowner and neighbors,
without discouraging votes on proposals affecting the community at
large. Admittedly, drawing such a line would be somewhat crude
and arbitrary. Yet it would provide some degree of certainty to
proponents of ballot measures, to local legislatures, and to courts
administering the law. Even a crude line would provide more due
process than the electoral due process solution of Arnel, and would

221.
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permit more votes on land use policy questions than are allowed by
more restrictive states. Some judicial economy would be retained.
Making the line presumptive rather than fixed would allow court
challenges so that votes could be utilized for small projects with
substantial policy implications, and rejected for bigger projects with
few policy aspects.

